Legal system and corporate finance.
• Existing research: La Porta et al ….
• => Positive relationship between effective legal systems and capital market development (IPOs, economic growth, market valuations etc).
• But:-4 Legal System and Venture Capital.
• Botazzi et al (2005): Tougher legal system => more governance by VC => VC and E's efforts higher => increased performance. Features of VC/E contracting.
• VC more than just a Passive Investor.
• Provides 'value-adding services.'
• => Not just a pure principal-agent problem.
• Double-sided Moral Hazard Models -both E and VC exert effort. • Existing Models: narrow self-interest. 6 Our Model.
• Psychological Sympathy/Empathy Game • Double-sided Moral hazard.
• Relationship between Legal system, E's and VC's efforts, and performance. • Tougher legal system => Tougher Contracting => destroys cooperation => Higher or Lower Performance?
Timeline:
• • Model can be used to classify societies' optimal contracts, given legal system and closeness? • Recommendations to regulators on optimal toughness of VC/E contracts given the legal system? • Eg China? Weak Legal system, Cultural Closeness? => soft VC contracts optimal?
